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International competition is causing a fundamental transition in the
workplace that highlights the need for corporate law scholars to rethink the
standard assumption that the objective of the firm is shareholder wealth
maximization.' Under the traditional method of work organization, firms
reduce their dependence upon labor cooperation, supposing that workers
will shirk when the opportunity arises. 2 This system also assumes that
productive efficiency requires that managers formulate strategies concerning
technology, work processes, and plant locations because workers are not
competent to evaluate such matters. Seeking to gain a competitive edge in
the global marketplace, many U.S. managers are changing their industrial
relations policies by building effective work teams that encourage employee
voice in shopfloor decisionmaking.3 These programs, however, provide only
a limited form of worker participation, preserving unilateral managerial
control over firm policies.
As international competition intensifies, corporate law scholars have
adopted a comparative approach to search for alternative governance struc-
tures. For the most part, however, the focus of this analysis is too narrow.
Assuming that the essential nature of the enterprise centers around the
shareholder-management relationship, 4 recent research has concentrated most
1. This article continues my work in this area. Marleen A. O'Connor, Corporate
Malaise-Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STETSON L. REV. 3 (1991); Marleen A.
O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-
Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 899 (1993) [hereinafter Human Capital];
Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1189 (1991) [hereinafter
Displaced Workers].
2. Under this system, management seeks to maintain control over production processes
by segmenting tasks into repetitive motions, employing intensive monitoring, and establishing
steep hierarchical chains of authority. These shopfloor practices began in the early twentieth
century when industrial engineer Frederick W. Taylor devised the method of production
referred to as "scientific management." FREDERICK TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT (1911); see also HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITL: THE
DEGRADATION OF WORK IN Tr TWENTIETH CENTURY 126 (1974).
3. For further discussion of how firms are changing production processes to meet
changing market demands, see, e.g., PETER B. DOERINGER ET AL., TURBULENCE IN THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE (1991); THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1987); MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHAREs F. SABEL, Tan SECOtND INDUSTRIAL
DrvmE: PossmIITrs FOR PROSPERITY (1984); ROBERT REICH, THE NExT AMERICAN FRONTIER
(1983); William H. Simon, The Politics of "Cooperation" at the Workplace, RECONSTRUCTION,
Winter 1990, at 18, 21.
4. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional
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of its efforts on examining how financial intermediaries in Germany and
Japan monitor management.5 I believe that a broader viewpoint is necessary
because two aspects of the German and Japanese systems indicate that
managers may be pursuing more complex objectives than shareholder wealth
maximization.6 First, employees are given a voice in strategic decisionmak-
ing-legally in Germany and implicitly in Japan. This feature symbolizes
that German and Japanese enterprises encompass workers and shareholders
as partners who have common interests in increasing the internal efficiency
of the firm. Accordingly, corporate scholars are considering only part of
the story when they discuss the role of institutional investors in these
codetermined firms. A second and related feature is that German and
Japanese firms use less hierarchical forms of work organization than the
United States. German and Japanese shopfloor practices develop the work-
ers' capacity to. communicate information about production processes and
adapt to flexible work assignments. The nature of the employees' firm-
specific investments indicate that they share in the residual risk of the firm.
These two features of the German and Japanese systems are interconnected;
employee voice in corporate governance safeguards firm-specific investments
from expropriation and facilitates employee commitment to the firm.
The point is that the German-Japanese experience indicates that cor-
porate scholars need to make an in-depth examination of how the corporate
governance systems of other countries complement their labor laws and
industrial relations practices. Such inquiry will enable us to view corporate
governance as a socio-cultural infrastructure which influences the employees'
access to information, channels of communication, and intrinsic value of
work. In turn, this more complex perspective will allow us to devise
corporate governance structures that will promote changing shopfloor prac-
tices in the United States.
In Part I of this Article, I stress that the development of corporate law
scholarship along these lines depends upon the way we portray human actors
Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation (forthcoming); Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraak-
man, Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate
Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. Ry. 986 (1993).
5. See supra note 4. But see Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the
Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102
YALE L.J. 871, 874 (1993) ("[O]ur system's characteristics color the lens through which the
first comparative studies viewed the rest of the world.").
6. Masahiko Aoki, Non-Hierarchical Aspects of the Internal Organization of the En-
terprise: A Partial Survey in Comparative Perspective, STANFORD DIscussION PAPER SExuas,
CEPR Publication No. 331 (1992) [hereinafter Non-Hierarchicalj. For further commentary on
the Japanese firm, see MAsArnuo AoKi, INFORMATION, INCENT rS AND BARGAINING IN THE
JAPANES ECONOM (1988); THE ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF THE JAPANESE FIRm (Masahiko Aoki
ed., 1984); Masahiko Aoki, The Japanese Firm as a System of Attributes: A Survey and
Research Agenda, STANFORD DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, CEPR Publication No. 288 (1993)
[hereinafter Attributes]; Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm,
28 J. EcON. Lrr. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Economic Model].
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and implicit employment agreements. In my view, corporate scholars need
to recharacterize the firm as encompassing not just conflict and exchange,
but also cooperation and consensus. Developing this new view requires us
to shift away from the established conception of isolated economic actors
entering into contracts and toward picturing persons in an enterprise joining
in a network of social relationships to pursue common goals. Specifically,
we need to decommodify our image of the employment relationship to
embrace notions of morality and commitment. Part I reveals that the
prevailing economic theory has little to contribute to this vision of corporate
governance; this model focuses upon preventing opportunism because it
presumes that work produces disutility. For these reasons, Part I turns to
the field of socio-economics to obtain more realistic insights into human
behavior and the firm. Rather than simply adopting the self-interest pos-
tulate, this research incorporates psychology and sociology to study altruistic
motives. This background will allow us to analyze how corporate governance
structures can advance work climates that encourage employees and man-
agers to replace self-interest with a concern for others.
To further our understanding of participatory work programs, Part II
examines the psychological aspects of employee voice by exploring research
in the area of procedural justice. This literature demonstrates that people
respond to the procedural aspects of decisionmaking at least as much as
the outcome itself. In this Part, I will examine Professor Karen Newman's
article in this symposium issue7 which extends her important work concerning
how corporate cultures influence corporate decisionmaking.8 Newman con-
cludes that providing employees with voice is the most effective method to
raise perceptions that the corporate climate is ethical and enhance employee
commitment and work group cohesiveness.
In Part III, I incorporate the lessons from the first two Parts to comment
on how the results of procedural justice research can be translated into a
richer paradigm of corporate law. In this Part, I present a model of the
Japanese corporate governance system that explores how the financial and
employment structures of the Japanese firm complement each other and
mutually support participatory work programs.
I conclude by asserting that the essential weakness in American corporate
law is that it fails to provide worker representation in corporate governance.
7. Karen Newman, The Just Organization: Creating and Maintaining Justice in Work
Environments, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1489 (1993).
8. Karen L. Newman, Procedural Justice and Ethical Decision Making, 6 Soc. JusT.
RES. 113 (1993) [hereinafter Procedural Justice]; Karen N. Gaertner, The Effect of Ethical
Climate on Managers' Decisions, in MoRAurry, RATIONALrrY, AND EpCICmcy: NEw PERSPEC-
TIVES ON SocIo-EcoNoamcs 211 (Richard M. Coughlin ed., 1991) [hereinafter Ethical Climate];
Karen N. Gaertner & Stanley D. Nollen, Career Experiences, Perceptions of Employment
Practices, and Psychological Commitment to the Organization, 42 HuM. REL. 975 (1989)
[hereinafter Career Experiences]; Karen Gaertner, Winning and Losing: Understanding Man-




Providing employees in the United States with a voice in corporate gover-
nance will encourage workers to grow as moral agents and foster labor-
management cooperation to meet the demands of-a changing world econ-
omy.
I. A SocIo-EcoNomIc MODEL OF WORKER COMMITNENT
My basic premise in this Part is that conventional economic models fail
to capture the nature of contemporary productivity issues because labor-
motivation problems extend beyond economic incentives and threats. Al-
though short-term worker compliance can be obtained by external rewards
and punishments, devising such monitoring schemes so that employees
devote themselves to their fullest ability is costly and time consuming. More
importantly, close supervision produces an adversarial atmosphere that leads
to a low level of worker commitment.9 Participatory work programs depend
upon attitudes that do not compute the net benefit from every unit of
effort. Rather than relying upon economic incentives, management theories
stress that labor efficiency for participatory work programs is based upon
corporate values that signal fair treatment of employees. 10 Studies, however,
reveal that worker commitment to their firms is declining." Accordingly,
managers face the challenge of how to shape corporate cultures that will
recapture employee loyalty in an unstable economic environment.
Following German and Japanese labor practices, American managers
are relying upon team effort to instill a commonality of purpose and promote
bonds of commitment among workers. To facilitate team work, firms replace
the traditional emphasis upon the individual with greater dependence upon
the group. Standard economic analysis predicts these actions will create
incentives for each employee to shirk her responsibility because the individual
worker's input has only a small impact on output.'2 This standard "free
rider" response to collective action illustrates a basic misconception of the
pursuit of common goals. To appreciate German and Japanese industrial
relations practices, we must explore how to prevent moral hazard problems
by considering notions of worker morale and team spirit.
To understand participatory work programs, we must shift from the
prevailing economic concentration on short-term selfishness to the com-
munitarian focus on long-term collective benefit. To do this, we can turn
9. BRAVERmAN, supra note 2, at 125.
10. Peter Doeringer, The Socio-Economics of Labor Productivity, in MoRALrry, RAmiON-
AtrrY, AND EFFiCIENCY, supra note 8, at 103, 106.
11. See, e.g., RicHARD T. MOWDAY Er AL., EmPLOYEE-ORGANIZATION LnKAoaGS: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF COMMITMENT, ABSENTEEISM, AND TURNOVER 12-13 (1982).
12. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz first highlighted the measurement problems that
arise when workers produce goods in a group. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. ECON. REv. 777 (1972);
see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS Aln HiRARcmS: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRusr IMPLI-
CATIONS 53-54 (1975).
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to socio-economics,"3 which encompasses noninstrumental motives such as
the human need to share in collective activities. This richer picture corre-
sponds with our intuition that employees will perform at a higher level if
they view their daily work as part of a collaborative adventure, rather than
"just a job." Accordingly, we can begin to comprehend how corporate
cultures appeal to the non-rational, affective elements within workers.
I am not suggesting that employees do not take an instrumental attitude
towards work; labor and management do not act against their self-interests
in the long-run. The proportion of consensus and conflict in the workplace
will depend upon the competitive position of the firm, the level of employ-
ment security, and other factors. My position is that it is crucial to study
the interaction of diverse incentives in the firm, recognizing not only self-
interested motives, but also the vitality of altruistic impulses.
14
A. Motives for Human Behavior: Self-Interest Versus Altruism
Economics is built on a model of the self-interested actor rationally
choosing a course of action after ascertaining the costs and benefits of
various opportunities. Assuming that people's motives are egoistic, neoclas-
sical economists reject the notion of altruism. 5 Instead, they claim that
enlightened self-interest governs expressions of ostensibly noneconomic be-
havior; people engage in charitable conduct to enhance their reputations or
receive favors in the future. 16 Socio-economics has a very different impres-
sion of altruism, suggesting that the motivations for our actions are more
complex and subtle than neoclassical economics generally assumes. Moral
factors constrain the impulse to act in a self-interested manner; when we
compute the costs and benefits of our behavior, we incorporate not only
our individual utility, but also preferences which reveal a concern for the
affect of our actions upon others.
Behavior is so often determined by an interaction of altruistic and self-
interested motives that it is difficult to isolate cases of pure altruism. 7 Such
an example can be found in experiments using one-shot prisoners' dilemma
13. See, e.g., AmrrAi ETzmom, TiE MORAL DIMENSION:. TOWARD A NEW EcONOMICS
(1988); Jon Elster, Selfishness and Altruism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 44 (Jane J. Mansbridge
ed., 1990); Jane J. Mansbridge, On the Relation of Altruism and Self-Interest, in BEYOND
SELF-INTEREST, supra, at 133; Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra, at 25.
14. Mansbridge, supra note 13, at 133; see also Karl E. Klare, The Labor-Management
Cooperation Debate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 39
(1988).
15. The present-aim model assumes that a person is rational if she pursues whatever
goals she currently holds. Under this model, moral values are referred to as a second source
of utility. This is not a proper use of the term utility. Amitai Etzioni, Socio-Economics: A
Budding Challenge, in SOcIo-EcONoMIcs: TOWARD A NEW SYNTimsIs 3 (Amitai Etzioni & Paul
R. Lawrence eds., 1991).
16. Oliver Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, J. ECON.
PERSP. (forthcoming).
17. Mansbridge, supra note 13, at 134.
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games~.' In this game, each player chooses whether to cooperate or defect.
The optimal solution involves both players choosing to cooperate. The
dilemma arises because a defecting party has an opportunity to receive the
largest return if the other party cooperates. Each player perceives that,
regardless of whether the other player decides to cooperate or defect, the
decision to defect will produce a higher return than the decision to cooperate.
The rational economic actor model predicts each player will defect, pro-
ducing an inferior outcome for both parties referred to as the "prisoners'
dilemma solution."
To overcome the prisoners' dilemma, the standard economic model
relies upon the motive of self-interest. This model changes the game by
introducing norms of behavior that are backed by sanctions imposed by the
community.' 9 According to this view, the community can exercise a tremen-
dous amount of influence upon the players' behavior through admiration
in the form of improved reputation and condemnation in the form of
humiliation and shaming. Importantly, these conventions operate not by
modifying a player's preferences between cooperation and defection, but by
adjusting her expectations about how the other player will act. In other
words, each player can feel safe in choosing to cooperate knowing that
reputational concerns will prevent the other party from exploiting this
vulnerable position.
In contrast to the traditional approach to solving the prisoners' dilemma,
socio-economists reveal that it is possible to obtain the optimal outcome by
relying upon two types of altruistic motives. The first type requires that the
players feel an ethical obligation to pursue a cooperative course of action.
Specifically, studies of one-shot prisoners' dilemmas games reveal that some
participants refuse to defect because they are motivated to "do the right
thing." '2 To explain these results, socio-economists posit that altruistic
motives alter the payoff matrix in a prisoners' dilemma game so that the
cooperator's reward from acting morally outweighs the benefit from defec-
tion.2' The second type of solution to the prisoners' dilemma relies upon
feelings of group solidarity. Studies demonstrate that permitting dialogue
that raises perceptions of collective identity can increase the chance that
both players will choose to cooperate to 85 percent.? Importantly, this team
spirit enhances cooperation independently of the dictates of conscience,
future reciprocity, or reputational repercussions.u
18. For an introduction to game theory and the prisoners' dilemma see, e.g., DAVID M.
KRnps, GAmE THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING 29-39 (1990); ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMEs AND
INFORMATIoN: AN INTRODUCTION To GA.m THEORY 27-30 (1989).
19. For further discussion of how conventions solve coordination games, see KREFs,
supra note 18, at 65. See also ANDREW SCHOTTER, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIAL
INsTrruTioNs 11 (1981).
20. Robert H. Frank et al., The Evolution of One-Shot Cooperation (forthcoming
ETHOLOGY & SOcIOBIoLOGy).
21. Mansbridge, supra note 13, at 136.
22. Id. at 134-35.
23. Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperation for the Benefit of Us-Not Me, or My
Conscience, 97 in BEYoND SELF-INTERmsT, supra note 13.
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In sum, the solutions to the prisoners' dilemma developed by the rational
choice model and socio-economics present dramatically different courses of
action to prevent collective action problems. The rational actor model solves
the prisoners' dilemma by developing institutions that make it in a person's
rational self-interest to help others. In contrast, the socio-economic model
relies upon the promotion of altruistic motivations; goodwill and mutual
understanding can foster a collective preference that benefits everyone.
We can begin to see how to break the prisoners' dilemma involved in
participatory work programs, that is, to ensure that managers and employees
choose to cooperate rather than defect.24 Labor efficiency depends upon
encouraging worker identification with the goals and values of the firm so
that internalized moral values ensure that workers act instinctively to benefit
the organization. Neoclassical economics, however, is poorly equipped to
approach such issues because it tends to assume that preferences are stable
and therefore ignores the effects of culture. In contrast, socio-economics
allows us to examine how corporate governance structures influence whether
firms develop corporate cultures that foster worker commitment. Before we
examine this socio-economic model, let us consider the vision of corporate
governance offered by the transaction-cost theory of the firm.
B. The Model of the Firm: Contract Versus Organization
1. The Transaction-Cost Model of the Firm
The transaction-cost model of the firm sheds important light on the
incentive aspects of various relationships within the firm. The general story
told by transaction-cost economists begins with a perception of the firm as
consisting of a nexus of long-term contractual relationships among share-
holders, managers, employees, suppliers, and the local community.25 These
autonomous resource-holders interact with each other solely through deals
of exchange set against a background of competition. According to Oliver
Williamson, corporate governance is a means to secure transaction-specific
investments against the opportunistic exploitation of temporary advantages
by the other parties to the contract. Specifically, board representation
depends upon the party's degree of asset specificity and uncertainty. For
Williamson, shareholders' investments, but not those of employees, have
high asset specificity that requires protection from unfair advantage through
24. For an application of the prisoners' dilemma to labor-management relations see
HARvEY LIEBENSTEIN, INSIDE Tim FIRM: THE INEFFICIENCIES OF HIERARCHY 32 (1987); HARvEY
LIEBENSTEiN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: A Naw FoUNDATION FOR MICROECONOMncs 29 (1976).
25. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 257 (1979). This theory builds upon Ronald Coase's seminal
theory of firms as cost-efficient alternatives to market transactions. Ronald H. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). For a critical evaluation of this theory's influence
on corporate law, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Ne=u of Contracts" Corporation: a
Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. Rv. 407 (1989).
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an opprortunity to monitor and participate in the management of the firm.26
Williamson's model makes significant contributions to our understand-
ing why parties organize their relationships within firms rather than through
markets. Economists, however, are just beginning to study the question of
why performance differs among firms operating under diverse national-
institutional structures. 27 Williamson recently addressed this issue, empha-
sizing that trading hazards involving uncertainty and opportunism vary
depending not only upon the type of transaction involved, but also upon
the conditions under which the transaction occurs. 2  Williamson submits
that commercial relationships evolve as the product of social conditioning
that takes place because of societal culture, politics, regulation, profession-
alization, networks, and corporate culture. 29 He maintains that institutional
environments that provide safeguards against opportunistic conduct alleviate
the demand for parties to devise transaction-specific protection. For exam-
ple, Williamson recognizes that the law can reduce transaction costs so that
parties can more easily invest in specialized assets.A0
To me, the degree of trust present in an organization can explain a
great deal of the variance in organizational efficiency among firms. Wil-
liamson, however, has quite a different view. Recently, he has sought to
clarify the concept of trust by distinguishing between three types of rela-
tionships.
2. Williamson's View of Trust
First, Williamson maintains that the terms "trust" and "risk" should
not be used interchangeably for commercial transactions involving calculative
relations. 31 Similar to the traditional economic model discussed above,
Williamson solves the prisoners' dilemma problem by developing institutions
so that the decision to refrain from opportunistic conduct or engage in
ostensibly altruistic conduct is based upon rational, algebraic reasoning.
Williamson begins by explaining that parties feel safe in making transaction-
specific investments if they operate in an environment that provides cost-
26. OLIVER E. WnA sON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS,
RELATIoNAL CorTrAcnTio 163-205 (1985) (discussing how parties attempt to foster trust by
giving credible commitments) [hereinafter CAPrrAJisM]; Oliver Williamson, Corporate Gover-
nance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210 (1984); Williamson, supra note 25, at 257. For criticism of
Williamson from a labor law perspective, see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the
Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. Cm. L. Ray.
73, 158 (1988).
27. Recently, Ronald Coase identified as critical the understanding of "why the cost of
organizing particular activities differs among firms." Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm's
Influence, 4 J.L. EcoN. & OROANIZATION 33, 47 (1988).
28. Williamson, supra note 16, at 26.
29. Id. at 26-30.
30. Id. at 28.
31. Id. at 26.
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effective reputational sanctions. Trust is not involved, rather trading hazards
are mitigated because reputational concerns will prevent the other party
from expropriating these investments. With respect to prosocial activities,
Williamson asserts that "if almost-automatic and unpriced assistance is the
most efficient response, provided that the practice in question is supported
by sanctions and is ultimately made contingent on reciprocity, then calcu-
lativeness obtains and appeal to trust adds nothing. "32
Second, Williamson recognizes that trust can arise in personal relation-
ships characterized by positive, forgiving feelings rather than calculative
monitoring. Williamson emphasizes, however, that the term "trust" should
be reserved for personal relations such as those between family, friends,
and lovers, not commercial transactions.3 He quotes Robert Nozick:
"The intention in love is to form a we and to identify with it as
an extended self, to identify one's fortunes in large part with its
fortunes. A willingness to trade up, to destroy the we you largely
identify with, would then be a willingness to destroy yourself in the
form of your own extended self." If entertaining the possibility of
trading up devalues the relation, a discrete structural shift that
disallows trading up, which is a variety of calculativeness, is needed.3
Thus, Williamson recognizes that people will not develop personal trust in
a calculating atmosphere.
Finally, Williamson discusses institutional relationships, acknowledging
that the calculative approach can be taken to extremes in certain types of
commercial transactions.35 Specifically, he argues 'that unless problems of
alienation and workers' dignity are considered, the image of economic
organization will be too narrow.3 6 Williamson recognizes that traditional
methods of work organization create calculating atmospheres that lead
employees to perform their jobs in a minimal or "perfunctory" rather than
a maximal or "consummate" fashion. He indicates that participatory pro-
grams create better climates for workplace cooperation because teamwork
and less monitoring increase the workers' self-respect and facilitate the
32. Id. at 20.
33. Id. at 27.
34. Id. at 33-34 (quoting ROBERT NOZiCK, AN EXAMINED LI' 78 (1989)). Williamson,
however, expresses some doubt about the value of trust for personal relationships:
Although some individuals may have the natural instincts to behave noncalculatively,
others will need to figure it out-to look ahead and recognize that calculativeness
will devalue the relation, which is a farsighted view of contract. It does not, moreover,
suffice merely to figure it out, in that some of those who do may be unable to shed
calculativeness-because calculativeness (or fear) is so deeply etched by their expe-
rience .... Such trust is also the stuff of which tragedy is made. It goes to the
essence of the human condition.
Id. at 35-36.
35. Id. at 37.
36. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 26, at 27 ("[Clapitalism is prone to undervalue




"transformation of 'involvement' relations, from a calculative to a more
nearly quasimoral mode ... .- 37 To Williamson, the corporate culture can
serve a useful function by maintaining cohesiveness in firms, by fostering
commitment, and by supporting personal integrity and honor.3 Accordingly,
Williamson seems to recognize implicitly that corporate cultures facilitate
strong personal relationships that create the "we" feelings that give rise to
trust. Yet, he fails to recognize the significance of these relationships: "If
the decision to suppress calculativeness is itself purposive and calculative,
then the true absence of calculativeness is rare if not nonexistent." 39 To
Williamson, nothing romantic or mushy surrounds Japanese employment
practices because calculativeness underlies the "soft" notions of cooperative
cultures in Japanese firms.4°
Although Williamson acknowledges that participatory work programs
create cooperative climates in the workplace, he asserts that these programs
probably will not succeed in the United States because they depend on the
background culture to provide reputational sanctions to prevent opportun-
istic conduct. 41 Williamson explains:
The "special problems" of soft contracting ... are particularly
great when soft contracting is introduced into an alien culture. The
reason for this is that the entire burden of providing contractual
safeguards falls entirely on the immediate parties to the transaction
if background cultural supports are missing. Should one of the
parties choose to defect, there is no further support for sustaining
the transaction to which either can appeal.
42
For these reasons, Williamson concludes that participatory programs may
be more viable in countries like Japan rather than the United States.
C. Trust and the Theory of the Firm
Williamson has made a substantial contribution to the theory of the
firm, but his treatment of employees has revealed some of its intrinsic
weaknesses. I agree with Williamson that trading hazards depend upon
environmental factors such as societal and corporate cultures. For these
reasons, I have written that even under Williamson's transaction cost model
of the firm, the law should mandate that workers have a role in corporate
governance because participatory work programs require employees to make
37. Wnn.AMSO, supra note 12, at 44.
38. Williamson, supra note 16, at 30 (quoting CHESTER B ARD, THE FUNcTIONS OF
THE ExEcutrvE 122 (1938)).
39. Id. at 30-31.
40. Id. at 30.
41. Oliver Williamson & W.G. Ouchi, The Markets and Hierarchies Programme of
Research: Origins, Implications, Prospects, in POWER, EFICIENCY AND INsTMrIoNS 13, 26-28
(Arthur Francis et al. eds., 1983).
42. Id. at 28.
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significant investments of human capital43 that involve a high degree of
uncertainty due to the possibility of expropriation. 44 In contrast to William-
son's faith in the free market,45 I argue that parties will not contract to
provide employees with a voice in corporate governance because cultural
norms, conventions, and institutions increase the transaction costs involved
in introducing codetermination through the contracting process. Given the
long-standing convention of shareholder supremacy and resistance to em-
ployee involvement in strategic decisionmaking, U.S. firms are reluctant to
deviate from the traditional system of corporate governance because they
fear reputational sanctions for violating established business practices.4
Thus, legal reform mandating codetermination is needed to facilitate an
atmosphere conducive to a high level of employee trust in volatile economic
conditions.
In response, Williamson has written cautioning me that the term "trust"
should not be used when discussing the employment relationship. 47 In this
Article, I will persevere with my theory that interpersonal trust is important
to our understanding why organizational abilities differ among firms, par-
ticularly with respect to productivity differences flowiig from labor-man-
agement cooperation. Specifically, we need to discuss how trust arises among
persons within corporations and how the law can foster societal conventions
that will reinforce cooperative corporate norms.
1. Criticism of the Transaction-Cost Model of the Firm
Williamson's economic organization reduces the firm to a series of long-
term contractual relationships between calculating individuals and dissolves
corporate governance into a mechanism that safeguards firm-specific in-
vestments against opportunism. In my view, this theory overlooks definitive
components of corporate governance, restricting the model's significance
for corporation law. 48 Specifically, Williamson fails to recognize the origins
43. O'Connor, Human Capital, supra note 1, at 917.
44. Id. at 907-11.
45. WILLIAMSON, supra note 12, at 9-10; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of
the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1423 (1993); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976).
46. See, e.g., Thomas A. Kochan & Michael J. Piore, Will the New Industrial Relations
Last? Implications for the American Labor Movement, ANNALS, May 1984, at 177.
47. Letter from Oliver Williamson to Marleen O'Connor, dated Sept. 2, 1992, com-
menting upon Human Capital article, supra note 2. Recently, economists have spent a great
deal of effort in clarifying the notion of trust in business relationships. See, e.g., Partha
Dasgupta, Trust as a Commodity, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS
49 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988); David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,
in PERsPEcTrvs ON Posmv POLrICAL EcONOMY 90 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle
eds., 1990); Lynne G. Zucker, Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic
Structure, 1840-1920, 6 REs. oN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. 53 (1986).
48. For other critiques of the neoclassical economic approach to corporate law, see
William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 Nw.
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of economic activity because the collective nature of corporate actors in an
organized network cannot be commodified into marketable elements. In
order to evaluate the comparative efficiency of various organizational forms,
a broader perspective is required. Socio-economics permits us to picture the
corporation as a moral world that influences the manner in which corporate
actors appreciate the ethical decisions-that pervade economic activity.
Taking a socio-economic approach, Mark Granovetter contributes to
our understanding of economic life by analyzing the nature of trust in
commercial networks.4 9 He emphasizes the significance of "embeddedness,"
which refers to how social relationships give rise to goodwill and commit-
ments that nurture trust. Granovetter asserts that parties in long-term
commercial transactions may develop we-feelings, comparable to the close
bonds among family members.5 0 These business friendships form, not merely
to further economic goals, but also to fill a person's need for companionship
and kindness in the social interaction that pervades daily worklife. Such
group affiliations have a personal history and connection that impact
commercial life"' through intimate self-expression which supports the asso-
ciation and alters the path of the alliance.
Recognizing the capacity to develop the empathic tendencies from which
moral sentiments derive, the socio-economic model presents a corporate
world of compassion and connection that allows an ethic of care to mature
and prosper. Similar to the prisoners' dilemma research, the socio-economic
model of the firm envisions the formation of the desire to "do the right
thing" that overcomes the utility derived from defecting. As applied to
participatory work programs, industrial relations practices are geared toward
transforming the utility functions of workers so that they engage in prosocial
behavior for noninstrumental reasons, such as feelings of belonging or basic
morals.
In sum, the socio-economic view of the role of trust in commercial
transactions encompasses both altruistic and self-interested inclinations. It
is true that in part, parties are motivated by self-interest because those who
violate trust incur reputational losses. In one-shot deals, however, a major
factor that supports trust is the internalization of values, a feeling that
violating one's obligation is unethical. These moral sentiments confer ma-
terial advantages in the long run. Robert Frank explains that because
L. REv. 180 (1992); Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate
Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 2215 (1992) (reviewing FRANK. A. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE EcoNoMIc STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) and ROBERT N. BEUAH ET
AL., THE GOOD SociErY (1991)); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Cult of Efficiency, 71 Tx. L.
REv. 217 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EAsTEPBROOK & DANML R. FiSCHEL, TH EcoNoMI~c
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)).
49. Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embed-
dedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481 (1985).
50. Id. at 490-91 ("In business relations the degree of confidence must be more variable
[than the family context], but Prisoner's Dilemmas are nevertheless often obviated by the
strength of personal relations." Id. at 491.).
51. Id. at 495-99.
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cooperators use signals to deal with other cooperators and avoid defectors,
the cooperators' altruistic motives allow them to make credible commitments
at a lower cost.
5 2
A great deal of difference exists between talking about how trust is
good for business because it enhances profitability and talking about how
trust leads to a morally satisfying life which in turn facilitates business. In
the next section, I will explore the significance of the language that we use
to think and talk about trust.
53
2. Talking About Trust: Cynics v. Innocents
Williamson notes that the "Science of Organization" is growing as
economists begin to undertake a comparative economic analysis of firms.
5 4
He stresses that this new science requires appropriate linguistics, urging that
the word "trust" should be used much more precisely among social scien-
tists: 55 "The world of commerce is reorganized in favor of the cynics, as
against the innocents, when social scientists employ user-friendly language
that is not descriptively accurate-since only the innocents are taken in."
'56
I share Williamson's desire to stop using the term "trust" to talk about
trading risks. Whereas Williamson prefers to avoid the use of the word
"trust" in commercial transactions, I maintain that a need exists for more
open use of ethical language in discussing economic life.
My point is that rhetoric counts: our discourse and our reality are
interdependent because language shapes our minds by habituating us to
particular world views.57 Language is a culturally sensitive system that
conveys meaning in various ways by embodying implicit exhortations and
52. ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS
249 (1988).
53. Elsewhere I have emphasized that the law and literature movement can help to
illuminate the nature of fiduciary obligation by teaching us to reflect upon the language we
use to talk and think about these legal duties. Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should We Talk
About Fiduciary Duty? Directors' Conflict-of-Interest Transactions and the ALIs Principles
of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 954 (1993). Other corporate scholars have
begun to examine the issue of trust in corporate law. William W. Bratton, Jr., Self-Interest
and Good Will in Corporate Fiduciary Law (unpublished manuscript, on file with author);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and the Promise of Corporate Community (forthcoming); Lawr-
ence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 1993 DUKE L.J. 425.
54. Williamson, supra note 16, at 36.
55. Id. at 37.
56. Id. at 30.
57. For an overview of the law and literature movement, see RICHARD A. POSNER,
CARDozo: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990); Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A
Misunderstood Relation (1988). For a law-and-literature criticism of economics, see Robin
West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political
Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HAgv. L. REv. 384 (1985); JAMES B. WHITE,
JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990). For a response
to this criticism, see Richard A. Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to
Professor West, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1431 (1986).
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social evaluations.5 In this way, speech patterns at once reveal and reshape
the attitudes and value choices of our community. Accordingly, the way we
talk about trust significantly affects commercial relations because linguistic
differences play an important role in constituting our social world. Specif-
ically, the motives of altruism and self-interest encompass the fundamental
conflict in psychology between the feelings of isolation and perceptions of
connection. 59 The opposite sensations of self and relationship give rise to
two distinct terminologies; we see that economics uses systematic notions
of utility, rationality, and maximization, whereas socio-economics employs
organic concepts of harmony, belonging, and empathy. In turn, these two
languages give rise to different forms of thought and experience. 60 William-
son's emphasis on calculating language is dehumanizing, provoking with-
drawal to foster independence, while ihe rhetoric of social connection is
uplifting, fostering togetherness to promote goodwill.
Talking about trust solely in terms of calculativeness tends to legitimate
behavior that conforms to it, bringing about a less satisfying way of life.
Disturbing evidence suggests that the traditional economic model impedes
cooperation by condoning selfish behavior;61 studies show that economists
are more likely than others to engage in opportunistic conduct. In addition,
when economics students play the prisoners' dilemma game, the level of
self-interested behavior rises, indicating that self-interested people study
economics or that economics students internalize self-interested values.
62
With respect to the firm, Mark Granovetter cautions that the transaction-
cost model views institutional arrangements as substitutes for trust, which
"results actually in a Hobbesian situation, in which any rational individual
would be motivated to develop clever ways to evade them; it is then hard
to imagine that everyday economic life would not be poisoned by ever more
ingenious attempts at deceit." 63 As applied to the work setting, Williamson's
calculating discourse perpetuates the zero-sum thinking that has character-
ized our history of adversarial labor relations."
3. Creating Institutions That Will Foster Trust
Repeated play of the prisoners' dilemma game allows implicit agreements
to refrain from opportunism to become self-enforcing; each player recognizes
58. WHmrE, supra note 57, at 3-4.
59. CAROL GILIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1988); Carol Gilligan, Do the Social Sciences
Have an Adequate Theory of Moral Development?, in SoCAL SCIENCE AS MORAL INQtRy 32,
48 (Norma Haan et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter Moral Development].
60. Gilligan, Moral Development, supra note 59, at 48.
61. John R. Carter & Michael D. Irons, Are Economists Different, and If So, Why?,
J. EcoN PaasP., Spring 1991, at 171; Robert H. Frank et al., Does Studying Economics
Inhibit Cooperation? (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
62. Mansbridge, supra note 13, at 135.
63. Granovetter, supra note 49, at 489.
64. William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. Rv. 1335, 1388-89
(1991) ("Commodification undermines the sense of intrinsic satisfaction in economic activities
by eroding the sense of connection between the activity of work and its socihl meaning and
by eroding the experience of work as membership in a community.").
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that the decision to defect in any round of play will trigger a similar
response from the other player in the next round. Once the players make
the initial move to cooperate, a "lock-in" effect arises that promotes a
pattern of collaboration throughout the game. 65 Thus, iterated prisoners'
dilemma games appear to lead to the development of informal norms that
facilitate cooperation. What underlies the origin of these norms? Some game
theorists rely upon morality or trust to explain why parties choose to
cooperate and why the lock-in effect occurs. 6 Williamson, however, rejects
the notion that the parties learn to trust one another.6 7 Instead, he empha-
sizes that we need to learn more about the ongoing processes through which
influences such as social conditioning and corporate culture affect economic
exchange. 6
Here, we find ourselves in a "catch-22." 69 Informal norms confirm the
fellowship and obligations of group members, allowing a group to develop
solidarity. Camaraderie, however, appears to allow a group to create such
norms in the first place.70 Robert Ellickson explains that "[o]ne possibility
is that the tightness of a groups's social structure and the welfare-enhancing
features of its norms are linked symbiotically, and gradually feed synergis-
tically on one another." ' 71 As applied to participatory work programs, Peter
Doeringer states that "the management of labor efficiency is directed at
dynamic, rather than static, efficiency and it emphasizes the importance of
social and organizational change as sources of labor productivity. '" 72
To further explore the processes by which corporate cultures facilitate
cooperative workplace conventions, we can turn to Jane Mansbridge's
discussion of how to promote self-interested versus altruistic motivations.
Mansbridge emphasizes that empathetic and moral inclinations do not have
unlimited value to most people and usually will not coritinue in the presence
of self-interested action by others.73 For example, researchers can increase
the level of self-interested behavior in prisoner's dilemma games by raising
the price of moral behavior or having the cooperators lose repeatedly.7 4
Unless cooperation is reciprocated, it diminishes over time because people
find it difficult to act with concern for others when norms condone narrowly
self-interested behavior.3 In contrast, once benevolent action is initiated,
65. ROBERT AXELROD, Tm EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); KREPs, supra note 18,
at 65-71.
66. Some rely on trust or moral grounds. David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation
in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, 27 J. EcON. THEORY 245 (1982); Amartya Sen,
Goals, Commitment, and Identity, 1 J.L. EcON. & ORGANIZATION 341, 342 (1985).
67. Williamson, supra note 16, at 24.
68. Id.
69. ROBERT C. ELLicKSON, ORDER WroTr LAW: How NEiOH oos SET=E DispuT s 123
(1991).
70. Id. at 238 n.24.
71. Id.
72. Doeringer, supra note 10, at 108.
73. Mansbridge, supra note 13, at 136.
74. Id. at 138.
75. Id. at 136-37; AXELROD, supra note 65, at 34.
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others may respond by cooperating with authentically altruistic motives. For
these reasons, institutions need to supply some self-interested reward to
altruistic action in order to prevent such behavior from being unreasonably
expensive.76 Such arrangements, however, do not nullify the substance of
moral inclinations; we may not be able to quantify the empathetic element
of behavior that also serves one's self-interest, yet this does not mean that
the moral component does not exist.n
In thinking about how to structure institutions to foster altruistic
impulses, Alan Wolfe emphasizes that we should seek to clarify the circum-
stances that permit people to form their own moral rules.78 Wolfe recognizes
that moral obligations stem from process, that is, the extent to which the
events of everyday life permit people to make their own decisions concerning
the issues that confront them.7 9 This focus on process allows individuals to
be self-determining while also acknowledging the role of socializing forces
such as group norms. By focusing upon the less intrusive procedural issue
of how to secure an environment that will encourage cooperative norms,
we can avoid the presumptuous practice of deciding what preferences
individuals should have.
In fostering corporate cultures that will allow employees to act as moral
agents, we need to consider the interplay between the legal system and less
formal systems of social control. In my view, the law exerts a tremendous
influence on the ongoing process of the development of cooperative norms
in the workplace. 0 Codetermination in Japanese and German corporate
governance mirrored the evolving relations between capital and labor in
those countries; at the same time, the new legal relationship had a major
influence on the forces within the firm. Of course, cooperative impulses are
not directly traceable to labor laws, but the law can influence the sociali-
zation processes that play a major role in preference formation. The most
significant aspect of employment law is symbolic and pedagogic because in
many instances the threat of formal sanctions is remote.8' To me, the way
we talk about trust in the employment setting is crucial because the most
distinguishing characteristic of labor law is its operation as a system of
moral education that promotes cooperation in the workplace. To further
explore how to create cooperative corporate climates, the next Part will
turn to literature in the area of procedural justice.
76. Mansbridge, supra note 13, at 137.
77. Id. at 138.
78. ALAN WOLFE, WHOSE KEEPER? SOCIAL SCIENCE AND MORAL OBLIGATION 244 (1989).
79. Id. at 245.
80. Lyman Johnson asserts: "[L]aw-and-economics enthusiasts who have inherited, along
with the tools of neoclassical economic analysis, its stiff-necked obliviousness to the social
influences on market activity fail to see the dialectic interaction of law and markets." Johnson,
supra note 48, at 2223.
81. Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and
Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1381, 1478-81 (1993).
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II. EMPLOYEES' VOICE:
A PROCEDURAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVE
Economists have not spent much time analyzing voice procedures.1
2
Taking a calculative approach, Williamson asserts that voice mechanisms
are designed to give credible commitments and prevent opportunistic con-
duct. 3 But there is another side to the story which has not been considered
by economists-voice may become an end in itself.. In order to explore this
aspect of voice, we can turn to procedural justice research. 4
Since procedural justice is a newly emerging field, scholars have not
yet developed intricate theoretical models from conclusively proven empirical
results.15 At this time, however, researchers have assembled data about
various issues that are related to the topic of how to develop corporate
.cultures that will foster employee commitment: Does providing employees
with voice enhance their perceptions of procedural justice? Do negative
outcomes affect employees' perceptions of voice procedures? Are procedural
justice opinions enhanced when employees lack actual control over mana-
gerial decisions, yet are given an opportunity to discuss their opinions? Can
management manipulate voice procedures to obtain procedural justice ben-
efits? Does procedural justice lead to greater productivity, work group
cohesiveness, and ethical decisionmaking? In this Part, I will review the
procedural justice literature addressing each of these questions. This discus-
sion will provide the background to examine the implications that procedural
justice has for the socio-economic model of the firm.
A. The Procedural Justice.Effects of Employee Voice
1. Process Control Versus Decision Control
Voice procedures have a significant influence upon the way employees
perceive their institutions; people view procedures that provide voice as
82. The most insightful economic analysis can be found in ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr,
VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
83. Williamson, supra note 16, at 9-11.
84. For an overview of the procedural justice literature, see TOM TYLER & RALPH
SCHULLER, A RELATIONAL MODEL OF AUTHORITY IN WORK ORGANIzATIONs: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1990); Robert Folger & Jerald Greenberg, Procedural Justice: An
Interpretative Analysis of Personnel Systems, 3 REs. PERSONNEL & HUM. RESOURCE MGMT.
141 (1985); Blair H. Sheppard & Roy J. Lewicki, Toward General Principles of Managerial
Fairness, 1 Soc: JUST. RES. 161 (1987); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice Research, 1 Soc.
JUST. RES. 41 (1987).
85. Some commentators assert that procedural justice research cannot be generalized to
real organizational settings because the empirical results are merely products of the laboratory
environments used to develop them. In many cases, however, field studies have not only
confirmed laboratory results, but indicate that the magnitude of procedural justice effects may




fairer than those that do not, particularly for negative outcomes . 6 The
ability of procedures to influence employee opinions apart from the results
of the procedure is highly significant because perceptions of procedural
justice affect employee compliance with work rules. For example, Professor
Newman's work has revealed that for workers who "lose" as a result of
organizational change, perceptions of fair treatment is an important factor
in gaining employee acceptance of the new arrangements. 87 Newman's study
is representative of the procedural justice research that shows that worker
commitment seems to have less to do with whether voice procedures provide
advantageous results than with how employees are treated during the deci-
sionmaking process. Of course, organizations have the strongest need to
make unfavorable outcomes more tolerable for workers. Thus, voice pro-
cedures aid in maintaining employee loyalty in the circumstances that are
the most beneficial to the organization.
Some studies show that procedural justice may have a stronger impact
upon employees' attitudes toward their organizations than distributive jus-
tice. Research demonstrates that distributive justice and procedural justice
judgments in employment settings are statistically independent, with pro-
cedural justice opinions having a larger effect upon job satisfaction, eval-
uations of supervisors, harmony in the workplace, and trust in management."8
In many cases, voice procedures allow workers to participate in mana-
gerial discussions, yet provide little influence over the final decision. Pro-
cedural justice researchers explore this type of voice by distinguishing
between "process control" and "decision control."8 9 Process control refers
to the chance to express an opinion to decisionmakers whereas decision
control involves an actual governance role in the decisionmaking process.
Several studies have focused upon whether people perceive that process
control provides fairer treatment than procedures that do not allow any
voice, even when the opportunity to state one's views accomplishes no
purpose beyond the procedural relationship. Studies show that employee
perceptions, of procedural fairness rise in these circumstances, indicating
that the opportunity to speak may have value in itself.9° Researchers explain
that these so-called "value-expressive effects" depend on the belief that the
86. See, e.g., Robert J. Bies, Beyond "Voice". The Influence of Decision-Maker Justi-
fication and Sincerity on Procedural Fairness Judgments, 17 REPRESENTATIvE RES. Soc.
PSYCHOL. (1987); Robert J. Bies & Debra I. Shapiro, Voice and Justification: Their Influence
on Procedural Fairness Judgments, 31 AcAD. MamT. J. 676 (1988); Robert Folger, Distributive
and Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of "Voice" and Improvement on Experienced
Inequity, 35 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 108 (1977).
87. Gaertner, Winning and Losing, supra note 8.-
88. Sheldon Alexander & Marian Ruderman, The Role of Procedural and Distributive
Justice in Organizational Behavior, I Soc. JusT. REs. 177, 192-94 (1987).
89. LIND & TYLER, supra note 85, at 186.
90. Tom R. Tyler, Conditions Leading to Value-Expressive Effects in Judgments of
Procedural Justice: A Test of Four Models, 52 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 333 (1987);
see also Tom R. Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction With Leaders: Exploring the
Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 79 (1985).
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authority involved is not acting in a self-interested manner. 91 Thus, if an
adversarial atmosphere prevails in the workplace, process control effects
may not occur.92 Although fairness judgments are enhanced by the oppor-
tunity to voice opinions even when there is no chance of altering the
decision, it is clear that voice with actual control leads to even greater
perceived fairness.
The existence of value-expressive effects raises the possibility that man-
agers may be able to manipulate procedural justice results. Because the
experience of procedural justice depends upon the perception that the
decisionmaker is taking the workers' views into account, managers may
attempt to deceive workers in order to obtain the benefits of procedural
justice without offering real voice. Thus, we must consider the possibility
of "false consciousness," that workers may be misled by procedures that
appear fair, but are fundamentally unjust.93
2. False Consciousness and the Frustration Effect
Although procedural justice researchers do not provide a method to
prevent the false consciousness problem, they emphasize that some studies
reveal that strategic uses of procedures may backfire. Specifically, process
control may produce a "frustration effect," which occurs when apparently
fair procedures produce perceptions of greater unfairness than procedures
that appear to be less fair 4 When people sense that the chance to express
an opinion is a "sham," process control may provoke anger toward the
decisionmakers, leading workers to engage in skillful disobedience. 95
In considering the frustration effect, however, it is important to restate
that many studies demonstrate that process control raises perceptions of
procedural justice for unfavorable outcomes. 96 These overall results have
led some commentators to conclude that the frustration effect is uncommon,
arising in limited situations where the evidence is clear that the procedures
are tainted. Even when an extreme conflict of interest exists between an
allocator and recipient, some studies show that people tend to accept that
procedures operate as describedY7 In addition, when recipients are upset by
inequitable distributions, the allocator often can alleviate the dissatisfaction
by justifying the results in procedural justice terms.9 Some researchers
conclude that process control may create an illusion of actual control because
91. LnD & TYLER, supra note 85, at 176.
92. Tyler, supra note 90, at 339.
93. LIND & TYLER, supra note 85, at 172.
94. Ronald Cohen, Procedural Justice and Participation, 38 HuM. REL. 643, 647 (1985);
Roger Folger, Voice and Decision Control, in 1 REs. oN NEGOTIATION ORGANIZATIONS (R.
Lewicki et al. eds., 1986).
95. Cohen, supra note 94, at 651.
96. LiND & TYLER, supra note 85, at 183.
97. Id. at 184.
98. Id. Bies & Shapiro, supra note 86, at 683.
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people tend, given the slightest support, to believe that they are in com-
mand. 99
On the other hand, the frustration effect shows that people behave like
"intuitive detectives,"''00 scrutinizing the decision-makers' objective in allow-
ing voice and looking for evidence that their viewpoints were regarded
before rejected. Recipients may recognize that the opportunity to speak is
a pretense designed to lull them into accepting the allocation, rather than
a genuine effort to solicit opinions.10' Evidence of the frustration effect may
explain certain studies that show negative employee reactions to participatory
work programs. When worker dissatisfaction occurs, managers are apt to
dismiss voice procedures as ineffective. Yet, workers may believe that
managers are insincere in their efforts to consider the employees' opinions,




In my view, the procedural justice literature's focus on employee voice
is too narrow. So far, the literature has examined only hierarchial, capitalist
corporations that seek to maximize shareholder wealth. The type of "voice"
studied is a very limited form of employee participation. Indeed, "process
control" sounds like a form of Orwellian doublespeak because it really
involves no control at all. Even where workers have decision control, the
continued viability of the procedures is unilaterally determined by manage-
ment. Thus, the procedural justice research tends to legitimate the existing
power structure of the firm. The frustration effect, however, may indicate
that participation has a self-reinforcing feature. That is, process control
may cause employees to seek a redistribution of control that allows them
more extensive participation to defend their interests. Future procedural
justice research on employee" voice needs to expand to include participation
in matters relating to investment, product mix, work organization, and
technology.
Research confirming the frustration effect is significant because partic-
ipatory work programs rely upon workers voluntarily assuming tasks that
are not specified by job descriptions. Although much work remains to be
done, procedural justice researchers expect that procedural fairness has a
strong positive influence on worker commitment to their organizations. In
the next section, I will explore this issue by examining the procedural justice
literature on the relationships between voice procedures, commitment, and
productivity.
99. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
100. Bies, supra note 85; see also Ronald Cohen, Perceiving Justice: An Attributional
Perspective, in EQurry AND JUSTCE iN SodcA. BEHAv oR 119 (Jerald Greenberg & Ronald L.
Cohen eds., 1982).
101. LInD & TYLER, supra note 85, at 181; cf. Ronald Foiger et al., Effects of "Voice"
and Peer Opinions on Responses to Inequity, 37 J. PERsoNALTrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 2253, 2259
(1979) (co-workers' opinion that outcome is unfair negates positive impact of voice).
102. Cohen, supra note 94, at 655.
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B. Procedural Justice, Worker Commitment, and Productivity
1. Corporate Culture and Worker Commitment
In analyzing issues concerning employee loyalty, the procedural justice
research distinguishes between instrumental commitment and psychological
commitment. Whereas instrumental commitment seeks utilitarian gain from
the employment relationship, psychological commitment refers to a willing-
ness to give energy to an organization for its own sake.'0 3 Studies show that
workers who develop an affective attachment to the values and goals of an
organization show more pro-social behavior than those with an exchange-
based connection to the organization.' 4
Professor Newman has done a considerable amount of research on how
corporate cultures affect psychological commitment. She explains that worker
behavior is greatly influenced by corporate norms and values because the
corporate climate conveys a sense of identity for its members and facilitates
commitment to something larger than the self. 05 Newman explains that the
corporate culture shapes decisionmaking by prohibiting consideration of
factors that are inconsistent with the firm's culture and by emphasizing
options that complement the firm's culture. 106 For example, she has found
that managers enghge in more ethical decisionmaking in organizations
perceived to have a caring climate, whereas instrumental criteria are used
when the climate supports it.107
In another study, Newman found that although a caring climate has a
positive influence on moral intent, perceptions of voice had the opposite
effect. These results are surprising because one would think that perceptions
of voice would signal and reinforce an ethical climate, which in turn would
promote the use of moral criteria in decisionmaking.'0 Newman explains
that employees may presume that voice guarantees the use of moral criteria,
so that participation produces complacency which reduces the likelihood
103. Richard T. Mowday et al., The Measurement of Organizational Commitment, 14 J.
VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 224, 225-26 (1979); Charles O'Reilly III & Jennifer Chatman, Organiza-
tional Commitment and Psychological Attachment: The Effects of Compliance, Identification,
and Internalization on Prosocial Behavior, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 492, 492 (1986).
104. Mary A. Konovsky et al., Relative Effects of Procedural and Distributive Justice on
Employee Attitudes, 17 REPRESENTATivE REs. Soc. PSYCHOL. (1987); O'Reilly & Chatman,
supra note 103, at 497.
105. Gaertner, Ethical Climate, supra note 8; see also Thomas A. DeCotiis & Timothy
P. Summers, A Path Analysis of a Model of the Antecedents and Consequences of Organi-
zational Commitment, 40 HuM. REL. 445 (1987) (analyzing structure, process, and climate of
organizational predictive of commitment); Robert Folger & Mary A. Konovsky, Effects of
Procedural Justice and Distributive Justice on Reactions to Pay Raise Decisions, 32 AcAD.
MriT. J. 115, 126 (1989) (suggesting that procedural justice has more effect than distributive
justice on trust in supervisor and organizational commitment).
106. Gaertner, Ethical Climate, supra note 8, at 212 (citing AMITAi ETzIONI, TIE MORAL
DIMENSION: TowARDS A NEw EcONOMICS (1988)).
107. Id. at 215.
108. Newman, Procedural Justice, supra note 8.
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that employees will make more ethical decisions. 109 Newman's study shows
that a more promising way to increase ethical decisionmaking is for super-
visors to treat employees with dignity and respect; such conduct will allow
employees to feel safe in using the same criteria in making their own
decisions.
Newman's contribution to this symposium issue reveals that the firm's
moral climate affects employee commitment; she found that voice and
supervisory relations have a positive influence upon employee identification
with the goals and values of the company.110 Newman concludes that
providing employees with a voice in decisionmaking processes is the most
effective method to raise employee perceptions of ethical corporate climates.
Her research is consistent with other studies emphasizing that the very act
of participating creates psychological commitment to the decision."'
In the past, Newman examined how firms seek to gain a competitive
advantage by raising employee commitment through employment practices
other than voice.112 She found that employee perceptions of internal job
mobility and job security are strong correlates of commitment. 13 In addition,
long-term employment contributes to psychological commitment." 4 Indeed,
these factors are more strongly related to psychological commitment than
participation and supervisory relations."s Newman concludes: "In addition
to creating jobs and work settings that foster employee participation, good
supervisory relations, and communication, firms may want to focus on a
career orientation, creating an environment in which internal mobility and
some employment security are available to employees.""11
6
2. Procedural Justice and Productivity
Although the procedural justice research shows that voice leads to
employee commitment to the organization, the relationship between voice
and productivity is less clear." 7 Because performance is determined by many
factors, it is probably unreasonable to expect any single factor to have a
direct effect on performance."' Although a growing body of empirical
evidence supports the view that collaborative workplace arrangements yield
109. Id. at 128-29.
110. Newman, Just Organization, supra note 8.
111. DeCottis & Summers, supra note 105.
112. Gaertner & Nollen, supra note 8, at 976.
113. Id. at 985.
114. Id. at 988.
115. Id. at 987.
116. Id. at 988.
117. P. Christopher Earley & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice and Participation in Task
Selection: The Role of Control in Mediating Justice Judgments, 52 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 1148, 1159 (1987) (suggesting that relationship between voice and performance is not
clear). For an overview of the literature evaluating the effect of participation on performance,
see Edwin A. Locke & David M. Schweiger, Participation in Decision-Making: One More
Look, I RES. ON ORGANizATIONAL HEHAv. 265 (1979).
118. LnD & TYLER, supra note 85, at 189.
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significant increases in employee productivity," 9 it is not possible to make
definite conclusions from the research available.
Some studies, such as the one conducted by Professor Newman, show
that employee voice motivates workers and contributes to enhanced per-
formance.120 On the other hand, other experiments reveal negative effects
upon productivity.12' In one study, for example, the experimenters hypoth-
esized that allowing employees to have a voice in their performance review
procedures would promote perceptions of procedural fairness, leading to
improved productivity. Although voice increased the perceptions of proce-
dural fairness, it corresponded to lower performance.'2 The researchers
explained that employees may exert less effort under these circumstances
because they may believe they- can obtain favorable evaluations without
regard to merit.
In sum, our knowledge of how procedural justice affects productivity
remains largely speculative. Given the general findings that voice strongly
influences employee attitudes towards their organizations, additional re-
search is clearly needed. Group decisionmaking in participatory work pro-
grams is expected to lead to better utilization and integration of knowledge
because these programs delegate control over production processes to em-
ployees on the shopfloor where useful on-the-spot information is available.'
21
Yet, the importance of worker knowledge may be overemphasized. Rather,
the main benefit of employee voice for the organization may stem from
gaining worker commitment to the decisions reached. Even if additional
research fails to show that voice leads to enhanced performance, the practical
significance of procedural justice lies in its ability to improve the quality
of work life.124
C. Procedural Justice Research and the
Socio-Economic Model of the Firm
As discussed above, studies demonstrate that perceptions of procedural
justice increase when employees are given voice in decisionmaking. Justice
theorists, however, debate about whether these results occur because of
instrumental motives, such as the assumption that specific processes generate
particular results, or noninstrumental purposes, such as fulfilling a desire
to be heard, regardless of the power over the outcome.' 5 Each of these
119. See, e.g., Barenberg, supra note 81, at 1480. Unions enhance the profitability of
participating work programs. Adrieene E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos, Unions and Contemporary
Innovations in Work Organization, Compensation, and Employee Participation, in UNIoNs
AND ECONOMIC COMPETTVENESS 189-94 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992).
120. Newman, supra note 7, at 1507-08; see also LIND & TYLER, supra note 85, at 187.
121. Ln D & TYLER, supra note 85, at 175.
122. Ruth Kanfer et al., Fairness and Participation in Evaluation Procedures: Effects on
Task Attitudes and Performance, I Soc. JusT. REs. 235, 245 (1987).
123. Masahiko Aoki, The Participatory Generation of Information Rents and the Theory
of the Firm, in THE FIRM AS A NExus OF TrEATIs 26, 27 (Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 1990).
124. LIND & TYLER, supra note 85, at 190.
125. Id. at 192.
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perspectives employs a distinct model of the person. The first model
corresponds to neoclassical economic theory by assuming that people judge
their social experiences in terms of the outcomes they receive and that these
outcome-based judgments control behavior. This second model offers a new
way of looking at people's reactions to organizational decisions that views
people as more interested in issues of process than results. 126 By examining
these two models, we can explore the need to revise the self-interested image
of the person which dominates the social sciences and corporate law.
1. The Self-Interest Model:
The Outcome-Based View of the Person
The two primary theories of procedural justice research use the self-
interested economic model to make predictions about procedural justice.'
27
The first theory, espoused by John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, explores
the amount of control that participants have in dispute resolution proce-
dures. According to Thibaut and Walker, decision control allows the par-
ticipants to prevent negative results, while process control allows them to
convince the decisionmaker to grant favorable outcomes. Thibaut and
Walker maintain that procedural justice may produce distributive justice,
but it is not necessary to use specific procedures to achieve just outcomes.128
In contrast to Thibaut and Walker's approach, the second instrumental
theory developed by Gerald Leventhal discusses six interpersonal features
of procedures that advance justice: consistency, bias suppression, accuracy,
correctability, representativeness, and ethicality. 29 According to Leventhal,
these procedural justice rules are meaningful because each increases the
possibility that the end result will promote group goals. Unlike Thibaut and
Walker, Leventhal argued that procedural fairness is a prerequisite to
obtaining distributive fairness. 30
Both of these theories are built on an egoistic view of the person which
assumes that people evaluate a procedure in terms of whether it will achieve
results, not for the procedure's own attributes. This theory explains that
group-oriented behavior such as cooperation and commitment occur because
people perceive that the outcomes they obtain from belonging to the group
are better than the outcomes they would obtain without the group.'
126. Id.
127. Id. at 221.
128. JOHN THiBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANAL-
Ysls 3 (1975).
129. Gerald S. Leventhal, What Should Be Done With Equity Theory?: New Approaches
to the Study of Fairness in Social Relationships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE: ADvANcES rN THEORY
AND RESEARCH 27, 39 (Kenneth J. Gergen et al. eds., 1980).
130. Gerald S. Leventhal, Fairness in Social Relationships, in CONTEMPORARY ToPIcs IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 211, 230 (John Thibaut et. al. eds., 1976).
131. Tom R. Tyler, When Does Procedural Justice Matter in Organizational Settings?, I
RES. ON NEGOTIATION ORGANiZATION 7, 15 (1986) (Stating that procedural justice reduces
uncertainty so self-interest served in long-run).
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Procedures are critical components of group activity because a group reveals
its values and objectives through its procedures. Accordingly, an unfair
procedure is much more threatening than a one-time unfavorable outcome
because procedures will continue to govern the relationship in the future.
Applied to the employment setting, organizations must reconcile productivity
concerns requiring high levels of group performance with the need to foster
long-term commitment to the group. 132 Procedural justice reduces uncertainty
for workers, providing a basis for a continued belief in the value of
organizational loyalty in the face of negative decisions.'
2. A Relational Model of Procedural Justice:
The Process-Based View of the Person
Procedural justice research shows that the enlightened! self-interest model
does not completely account for some procedural justice results. 34 For
example, one study permitted subjects in laboratory work groups to express
their views about work goals after the objectives of the group had been
established.'35 The experimenter informed the participants that they could
express their opinions about the goal, but that the goal would not be
changed. Compared to a control group that was not allowed voice, the
study shows that the opportunity for voice strengthens procedural fairness
judgments, as well as enhancing approval of the goal and performance.
36
Such findings contradict the instrumental notion that process control is
merely an inferior substitute for decision control. 3 7 It appears that the
opportunity for voice raises perceptions of procedural fairness independent
of the influence upon outcomes.
A group-value model of procedural justice is used to interpret these
results, providing two explanations that parallel those developed by game
theorists to explain cooperative outcomes in one-shot prisoners' dilemma
games.'38 The first theory focuses upon group identification processes,
emphasizing that people develop empathy which leads to concern for others
beyond matters of individual cost and benefit. 19 The basic assumption is
that group membership is psychologically rewarding because groups provide
132. Id. at 12.
133. LIND & TYLER, supra note 85, at 134.
134. Id. at 228.
135. Id. at 147.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 194. The subjects, however, appear to have believed they had some control,
even though the experimenter told them that their opinion would not affect the goal and when
the goal remained unchanged after they expressed their concerns. This study may indicate that
process control creates an illusion of real control. If such an illusion exists, it is possible to
account for the findings using the instrumental theory.
138. See supra note 20-23 and accompanying text.
139. LIND & TYLER, supra note 85, at 240; Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational
Model of Authority in Groups, 115 in 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
(Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992) [hereinafter Relational Model].
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emotional support and a sense of belonging. 14 This view emphasizes that
people are concerned with what procedures say about their status in the
group. 14' Voice procedures are perceived as fair because such procedures
imply a full-status relationship to the organization, one that enhances
personal growth, respect, and dignity. 42 The second explanation offered is
that people are influenced by social values about what is right and proper;
people are attracted to a "just" society and this appeal is strong enough
to influence people's thinking and actions. As applied to the work setting,
the group-value model suggests that interest in procedural justice stems
from concern about the interpersonal features of social relationships, rather
than productivity and efficiency. 4 The model emphasizes that voice pro-
motes democratic values and signals group membership.
3. The Implications of the Two Models of the Person for Participatory
Work Programs
The procedural justice literature reveals that people care deeply about
justice issues, yet it does not indicate that we should abandon the self-
interested model of the person. The critical issue is the extent to which
altruistic and self-interested motives influence procedural justice perceptions,
worker commitment, and productivity. Further research should continue to
explore how self-interested motives are modified into preferences, beliefs,
and behaviors that reflect a clear and long-term concern for others.
Although it may be difficult to disentangle instrumental and noninstru-
mental elements of voice procedures, it is clear that efficiency is a concept
that needs serious rethinking by economists and legal scholars. The need
for a broader perspective is significant because analysis based upon a narrow
group of behavioral assumptions may fail to grasp the nature of evolving
employee-employer relations. Although the need for increased productivity
has prompted managers to reject traditional labor philosophies, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that these policies were morally flawed from the
beginning. Workers have always deserved to be treated with equal respect
and dignity. If employees sense that the managers are allowing voice merely
,to enhance productivity, participatory work programs will be ineffective.'4
Accordingly, managers must recognize that worker participation is valuable
in its own right because it achieves human values by enhancing worker
dignity. In the next Part, I will further explore the topic of worker voice
by developing a socio-economic model of the employee's role in the Japanese
corporate governance structure.
140. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value
Model, 57 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 830, 831 (1989).
141. LiND & TYLER, supra note 85, at 189.
142. Folger & Konovsky, supra note 105, at 126 (discussing noninstrumental values such
as respect and dignity of workers).
143. Tyler, supra note 84, at 75.
144. Doeringer, supra note 10, at 114.
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III. THE EMPLOYEES' ROLE IN THE JAPANESE FIRM
The conventional notion found in the management literature is that
basic cultural attributes are responsible for Japan's distinctive labor rela-
tions. According to this view, the overall pattern of solid bonds between
individuals and groups in the Japanese culture fosters the strong attachment
that workers have to their firms. One reason for the prevalence of this
cultural thesis is that neoclassical economists view the Japanese workers'
eagerness to participate in team activities as being quite odd. History,
however, indicates that more than cultural factors were involved in the
formation of the present system of Japanese industrial relations. After the
Second World War, several influences, including government regulation,
operated to promote a corporate governance system that would elicit com-
mitment from the work force.
Masahiko Aoki uses economic principles to explain how the Japanese
corporate governance structure facilitates participatory work programs by
harmonizing relationships among the shareholders, managers, and employ-
ees. 14 Aoki stresses that it is not possible to properly understand Japanese
industrial relations and the financial arrangements of the firm if these
systems are viewed separately. Rather, these structures can be grasped only
when analyzed as part of an overall governance scheme. Under Aoki's
model, labor efficiency is enhanced by the monitoring function of the main
bank that serves to uphold implicit employment agreements, and the me-
diating role of managers who balance the interests of investors and em-
ployees. 1'
In this Part, I will briefly describe these components of Japanese
corporations. This broader picture of corporate governance highlights sig-
nificant incentive features of the Japanese firm that are not captured by
traditional models that concentrate solely on management-shareholder re-
lations. This economic model of the Japanese firm, however, contains several
drawbacks in explaining how to resolve the collective action problems
145. See supra note 7; see also Masahiko Aoki, The Contingent Governance of Team
Production, Center for Economic Policy Research Publication (1993); Masahiko Aoki, Mon-
itoring Characteristics of the Main Bank System: An Analytical and Historical View, Center
for Economic Policy Research Publication No. 352 (1993) [hereinafter Main Bank]; Oliver
Williamson, Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization, 12 STRATEoic MGMT. J.
75 (1991); Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and Control in
Japan, 11 J. EcoN. BEHAv. & ORGANIZATION 399 (1989) [hereinafter Monitoring]; Paul Sheard,
The Economics of Interlocking Shareholdings in Japan, Center For Economic Policy Research
Publication No. 259 (1991) [hereinafter Interlocking]. Use of this system of main bank
monitoring is decreasing due to deregulation and internalization of securities markets. Sheard,
Monitoring, supra, at 405.
146. The Japanese system of subcontracting also serves to support industrial relations
practices. Through subcontracting, the Japanese firm can externalize a substantial amount of
operational activities which serves to allow the firm to reduce the amount of permanent
employees and hire a homogenous body of workers. Aoki, Attributes, supra note 6, at 24.
For a detailed examination of the subcontracting system as it relates to the Japanese corporate
governance system, see Gilson & Roe, supra note 5.
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associated with team production. Exploring these weaknesses reveals ways
in which future research in socio-economics will enable us to develop a
richer and more complex picture of the employees' role in the Japanese
firm.
A. The Trading Hazards Inherent in Japanese Shopfloor Practices
The Japanese firm employs versatile shopfloor practices that are well-
suited to global competition which requires frequent adjustment to market
changes and technological developments. In general, the Japanese firm
attempts to raise productivity by utilizing shopfloor workers' first-hand
experience and by entrusting workers with more responsibility than would
be typical in the United States.1 47 In addition, job assignments are more
flexible, allowing Japanese workers to rotate among positions to develop
their problem-solving capabilities. This team work system is highly dependent
upon having individual employees work together, teach each other new
tasks, amd share information.
Although these practices allow the Japanese firm to respond to fluctu-
ating market conditions, this system contains higher risks of opportunism
by workers and managers than the methods commonly used in the United
States. Specifically, the firm's dependence upon the workers' flexibility and
knowledge raise several questions: How does the Japanese structure protect
the firm from the employees' ability to withdraw their cooperation once
they have developed an informational advantage concerning production?
How does the Japanese system create incentives for employees to reveal
information about job practices that could be used by management to
reduce employment? Japanese workers also face greater dangers because
Japanese shopfloor practices require workers to invest in more firm-specific
skills. Their exposure poses the issue of how the Japanese structure safe-
guards workers from the expropriation of their human capital investments.
Providing an overview of the Japanese employment system, Aoki uses
the gift exchange model 48 which describes the firm as providing workers
with a secure environment in return for higher effort. The reciprocal nature
of gift exchange suggests that if one party fails to meet the other's expec-
tations, the other party will respond in kind. Using this "tit-for-tat" strategy,
the parties learn to cooperate because norms develop to guide behavior.
Aoki emphasizes that when workers and managers collaborate under this
scheme, they are acting out of their own enlightened self-interest, rather
than out of loyalty to each other. In the next section, I will explore how
specific features of the Japanese corporate governance system enhance the
possibility of self-interested cooperation by mitigating particular trading
risks for workers and the firm.
147. Masahiko Aoki, The Participatory Generation of Information Rents and the Theory
of the Firm, in THE FiRM AS A NEXUs oF TREATiES 26, 27 (Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 1990).
148. George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J. EcoN. 543
(1982).
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1. Mechanisms to Protect Firms from Worker Opportunism
Economists have a difficult time explaining what prevents Japanese
team members from shirking. Some simply sweep the problem away by
assuming that all team members have the same goals. Aoki asserts that
employees as a group engage-in self-supervision to ensure that each member
follows a collective norm of work effort. 49 The workers' socialization
process is promoted by individual incentives associated with lifetime em-
ployment, compensation, and promotion schemes, and group incentives
facilitated by enterprise unions.
Long-term employment relationships are more common in Japan than
in the United States. Workers in large Japanese firms have an implicit
guarantee of lifetime tenure.' 0 The Japanese resort to layoffs only in extreme
circumstances, implementing shorter work hours, work sharing, and trans-
fers before issuing dismissals. Employment security creates an incentive for
greater work effort in three ways. First, these employment guarantees reduce
the workers' fear that their effort and information sharing will lead to
managers' reducing the workforce. Second, lifetime employment serves to
reinforce reputational sanctions within work groups because opportunistic
conduct will not soon be forgotten. Finally, the promotion system leads to
substantial differences in lifetime earnings among Japanese workers.' 5'
The firm provides pay incentives through bonus payments which depend
upon an employee's rank. Age and tenure are important determinants of
promotion for Japanese production workers while job characteristics play
a greater role for American workers. Japanese workers are not given
substantial promotions until they have provided ten to fifteen years of
service. In making promotion decisions, supervisors evaluate the worker's
reputation for cooperation among the worker's peer group. Frequent job
rotation within work groups facilitates mutual monitoring and sanctioning
among team members that aid in preventing shirking.
Just as promotional rank hierarchies provide incentives for individual
workers, Japanese unions 'may provide collective incentives for workers as
a group. Unlike the industry unions in the United States, the Japanese
enterprise unions negotiate on the firm level. The enterprise union's fate is
more closely tied to a specific firm, supporting the implicit gift exchange
between workers and managers. Specifically, repeated interaction between
the enterprise union, composed of permanent employees, and the manage-
ment team, recruited from within the ranks of shopfloor employees, promote
standards of behavior conducive to participatory work programs.
2. Structures that Safeguard Workers' Human Capital Investments
The high labor efficiency in Japanese firms generates economic gains
that can be shared with workers at the discretion of the managers. Such
149. Aoki, Attributes, supra note 6, at 32.
150. Id. at 13-14. Aoki stresses that discharge is used as an enforcement mechanism, but




discretion creates the potential for internal conflict over the allocation of
income, employment, and economic security. To protect Japanese employees
from managerial opportunism, the Japanese system relies upon judicial
recourse, disclosure of strategic information, and main bank monitoring.
In some instances, the Japanese courts enforce implicit lifetime em-
ployment policies. Under Japanese labor law, firms must give thirty days
notice before dismissing workers. In many cases, however, the courts also
require firms to show just cause and that no feasible alternative to the
layoff exists. 5 2 In addition, the courts allow workers to express their
opinions during reorganization proceedings, and rule against plans that fail
to sufficiently safeguard employee interests.
5 3
Although Japanese law provides some worker protection, to a large
extent, reputational sanctions operate to prevent firms from breaching
implicit employment arrangements. To enhance the effectiveness of these
reputational safeguards, the Japanese firm provides workers with informa-
tion that allows workers independently to assess the firm's economic con-
dition. In addition, strategic corporate policies are made after management
has conferred with workers through quality control circles and consensus-
based decisionmaking procedures. These information and consultation me-
chanisms provide workers with the opportunity to monitor the managers'
performance of implicit employment obligations; if managers renege upon
the gift exchange, employees can hold them accountable in future interac-
tions by reducing effort norms.
To observers of American corporate governance indoctrinated in zero-
sum thinking, a surprising feature of the Japanese system is that the firm's
shareholder and creditor relationships operate to promote job security for
workers. In the next section, I will examine how the Japanese main bank
system and labor practices complement each other to promote the efficient
operation of the Japanese organization.
B. The Role of the Main Bank
Large Japanese corporations have traditionally relied upon debt financ-
ing provided by several banks and have maintained close ties to the cor-
poration's principal creditor and largest shareholder, known as the firm's
main bank. 54 This banking system is part of a larger. industrial structure
known as the keiretsu, which encompasses a group of firms that maintain
stable patterns of reciprocal stockholdings and trading associations. 5 The
152. WLIAM B. GOULD, JAPAN'S RE HAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 106 (1984).
153. Aoki, Attributes, supra note 6, at 28 n.4.
154. Sheard, Monitoring, supra note 145, at 400-02. In contrast to the U.S. system,
Japanese financial institutions can hold debt and equity in the same firm. By relying upon
several banks, this system allows the main bank to reduces its losses in the event of default
and the firm to decrease its dependence upon a single source of financing.
155. Two-thirds of the shares of listed Japanese firms are held by domestic firms, including
banks and other financial institutions. Id. at 402.
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interlocking relationships of.the keiretsu serve to shield managers of Japa-
nese firms from takeovers.'56 This insulation allows management to take a
long-term view, yet raises the capital market's monitoring expenses to
prevent managerial shirking. The Japanese capital market also faces special
supervision costs because the workers' human capital investments increase
the firm-specificity of production information.' 57 The keiretsu reduces du-
plicative supervision efforts by delegating the monitoring function to the
main bank.
The hallmark of the main bank system is close information-sharing
between the bank and the firm.'58 If the firm is doing well, the main bank
does not exert explicit control over corporate policy. The main bank's
monitoring, however, allows it to discover difficulties as soon as the firm
begins to decline. At this point, the main bank decides whether the firm
should be rescued or liquidated. In rescue operations, the main bank will
supervise a recovery plan which includes rescheduling loan payments, pro-
viding emergency funds, liquidating some assets, and replacing top man-
agement. Nonmanagerial employees also face losses in the form of bonds
deferral, wage cuts, and more stringent working conditions. If the firm is
liquidated, the main bank will normally find new jobs for the displaced
workers.159 Here again, the workers face losses because the new jobs are
typically at less prestigious firms.
In conducting a rescue operation, the main bank is confident that the
other shareholders will not interfere in the main bank's efforts by imple-
menting alternative strategies or by selling their shares.' 60 Thus, interlocking
shareholdings facilitate the role of the main bank. At the same time, cross-
ownership and the bank system complement industrial relations practices of
the Japanese firm.'
6'
The Japanese managers' ability to detect the degree of cooperation
among team members is restricted because close supervision is costly; the
main bank system serves as an external monitor of team production. In the
event of poor performance, the main bank provides discipline by imposing
losses upon managers and employees. To prevent these losses, managers are
encouraged to voluntarily disclose information and allow main bank inter-
vention. In turn, bank monitoring provides workers with the motivation
needed to prevent free riding in team production.162 The main bank system
not only serves to reduce moral hazard problems, but it also creates an
environment in which workers feel safe in maintaining high levels of team
performance. Specifically, when the firm is doing well, the main bank
system relieves managers from outside pressure so that they have leeway to
156. Sheard, Interlocking, supra note 145, at 3.
157. Aoki, Attributes, supra note 6, at 28.
158. Sheard, Monitoring, supra note 145, at 405.
159. Aoki, Attributes, supra note 6, at 14.
160. Sheard, Interlocking, supra note 145, at 22.
161. Aoki, Main Bank, supra note 145, at 6.
162. Id. at 21.
1560
JAPANESE CORPORATE STRUCTURE
respect commitments to employees. 63 In times of crisis, the main bank
provides substantial assistance to displaced workers.
The industrial relations structure of the Japanese firm also serves to
facilitate the smooth functioning of the main bank system. In many cases,
it may be less costly for the main bank to liquidate a firm than attempt to
save it. 64 Since other investors have assigned the monitoring role to the
main bank, they may not be able to recognize when the main bank dodges
its obligation by liquidating a firm that should be rescued. Thus, how can
the main bank credibly commit to save a firm when the rescue costs exceed
the value of its loan? Aoki suggests that the workers ensure that a main
bank will perform its responsibilities. Since employees can observe output,
their strong voice operates to deter opportunistic conduct by the main bank
versus other creditors.
6 5
C. The Neutral Referee Model of Corporate Governance
Aoki rejects the' traditional model of corporate governance that posits
that the shareholders have unilateral control over managers who seek to
maximize shareholder wealth. Instead, Aoki models the firm as a bargaining
process between the employees and the shareholders. For the iterated pri-
soners' dilemma game to yield cooperation, both parties must have some
assurance that the other party will be a repeat player. Otherwise, an end-
game problem arises, causing cooperation quickly to unravel. 1' In the
Japanese firm, the employees are also "locked in" because their human
capital investments are firm-specific; shareholders are "locked in" because
of the stable pattern of reciprocal ownership. Thus, Aoki's model presents
a relatively permanent group of shareholders and employees engaged in a
repeated bargaining game.
Aoki asserts that Japanese managers serve as neutral referees to balance
the conflicting objectives of shareholders and managers. 6 7 The dualistic
control structure of the Japanese firm provides incentives for the managers
to perform this role. Employees can exert substantial influence over man-
agement as a group by threatening to withdraw cooperation. In many cases,
the enterprise union can force top management to resign. When the firm
performs poorly, the role of the employees becomes subordinated to that
of the main bank, which sends in its own management team. 68
163. Sheard, Interlocking, supra note 145, at 25.
164. Aoki, Main Bank, supra note 145, at 22; Sheard, Monitoring, supra note 145, at
412.
165. Aoki, Main Bank, supra note 145, at 39. Some economists surmise that repeated
participation in these banking consortiums ensures that the main bank fulfills its rescue mission
because its reputation as a responsible monitor is at stake. Aoki, however, is not convinced
of the reliability of these reputational sanctions.
166. Reinhard Selten, The Chain-Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127 (1978).
167. Gerald T. Garvey & Peter L. Swan, The Interaction Between Financial and Employ-
ment Contracts: A Formal Model of Japanese Corporate Governance, 6 J. JAPANESE & INT'L
EcoN. 247 (1992).
168. Aoki, Main Bank, supra note 145, at 19.
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The implication of this multi-stakeholder corporate governance structure
is that the Japanese firm cannot be viewed as pursuing a single goal. Rather,
the bargaining process that reconciles the conflicting interests of shareholders
and managers leads the firm to pursue a more complex objective than
shareholder wealth maximization.' 6 9 As a result of the employees' role, the
Japanese firm will pursue a higher rate of investment and will provide job
security to a smaller work force.
D. Socio-Economics and the Japanese Firm
This overview of the interrelated aspects of the Japanese firm demon-
strates that a number of non-contractual safeguards promote the building
and maintenance of long-term relationships within the Japanese firm. But
Aoki's model conforms to basic conventions of microeconomic theory which
construe parties' acts in instrumental, cost-accounting terms. Marginal costs
and benefit calculations, however, create an unsuitable metaphor for ana-
lyzing the motivational processes that create a workforce that is self-
supervised and self-disciplined. 170 Like Williamson, Aoki fails to take into
account the importance of personal trust relationships.' 7' Socio-economics
allows us to see that voice procedures may generate trust-building sentiment
by fostering bonds of friendship. Such interaction may aid workers to
discover their comnion concerns and transform self-interested preferences
to benefit the firm.
Importantly, Aoki suggests that to evaluate the role of reciprocity that
operates within the Japanese firm, we need to look at the role of government
regulations in bringing about the Japanese corporate governance system.
For the most part, economists focus on how the law provides deterrents to
opportunistic conduct by sanctioning the breach of agreements. They tend
to ignore the socializing force of the law. In my view, it is necessary to
appreciate that labor law reform is a highly symbolic event that clarifies
cultural values by presenting an idealized picture of industrial relations. 72
Unfortunately, we do not know how labor relations rhetoric influences
consciousness and behavior. 7 Economics, as well as psychology and soci-
ology, have much to contribute to our understanding of this important
issue. Procedural justice research may also be particularly helpful; by
assessing comparative data on workplace attitudes, we can better understand
the differences that exist between the corporate cultures of American and
169. MASAHIKo Aomi, THE CO-OPEATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM 126-27 (1984).
170. Doeringer, supra note 10, at 107.
171. For a calculative approach to trust relationships within the Japanes; and German
firms, see W. Carl Kester, Governance, Contracting and Investment Time Horizons, Working
Paper, Harvard Business School 19 (1991).
172. Alan Hyde, A Theory of Labor Legislation, 38 BuFf. L. REv. 383 (1990).
173. Id. at 391.
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Japanese firms. 7 4 This research will allow us to comprehend how the
Japanese law fosters governance structures that breed cooperative norms
for efficient production.
IV. CONCLUSION
Comparative analysis of the Japanese. corporate governance system
reveals several important attributes. First, stable stockholdings insulate
Japanese managers from the market in terms of corporate contr6l. Second,
the Japanese system enhances the economic power of workers through
information sharing and consultation mechanisms. Some commentators
assert that forces of international competition may cause the American and
Japanese models of corporate governance to converge. 75 We are beginning
to see signs pointing in this direction. Stakeholder statutes 76 and other legal
barriers insulate managers from hostile takeovers. In addition, institutional
shareholders are starting to engage in "relational investing" that may
promote more stable stock ownership patterns. Finally, depending on future
interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act,177 participatory work
programs could evolve into employee representative bodies that perform
roles similar to enterprise unions. Thus, several factors indicate that repeat
bargaining between the shareholders and employees in U.S. firms may
become more feasible in the future.
In my view, a comparative approach to corporate law does not allow
us to find new models to imitate, but it does permit us to gain fresh
perspectives about the essential nature of the firm. The most important
insight that we can gain concerning the Japanese model is that it contains
complementary structures for the financial and employment aspects of the
firm that mutually support production. To develop organizational arrange-
ments that will facilitate participatory work programs in the United States,
we must recognize that workers are not likely to exert maximum effort if
they are unprotected from the adverse consequences of doing so.
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The potential of participatory work programs may remain untapped in
the United States unless we merge the study of corporate and labor law.
As corporate scholars, we need to examine how American labor laws
promote adversarial relations that prevent shareholders and employees from
reaching cooperative solutions. Specifically, in contrast to most other in-
dustrialized countries, American labor law fails to restrict managerial control
by providing workers with the ability to effectively bargain through unions
and participate in strategic corporate decisionmaking. In addition, the United
States is one of the last industrialized countries that continues to allow
employment at will, permitting American firms to externalize the costs of
economic adjustment through layoffs and plant closings. Examining these
issues will allow us to encompass the changing nature of the employment
relationship within the legal model of the corporation. For the most part,
however, corporate scholars have been reluctant to examine the politically
sensitive issues surrounding employment. In my view, this is why a crisis
exists in corporate law.
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